Eur. Phys. J. B 71, 579-585 (2009)
https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2009-00160-1

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

¹ Department of Theoretical Physics, University of Geneva, 1211 Geneve 4, Switzerland
² Institute of Theoretical Physics, University of Wrocław, pl. M. Borna 9, 50-204 Wrocław, Poland
³ Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, P.O. Box 49, 1525 Budapest, Hungary

Corresponding author: ^a michel.droz@physics.unige.ch

Received: 30 October 2008
Revised: 30 March 2009
Published online: 5 May 2009

Abstract

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.