Eur. Phys. J. B 16, 189-194 (2000)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s100510070264

Optimizing conflicts in the formation of strategic alliances

¹ École Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Département de Physique, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94235 Cachan, France
² LMDH (Laboratoire associé au CNRS (UMR n 800)) , Université Paris 6, Case 86, 4 place Jussieu, 75252 Paris Cedex 05, France

Corresponding author: ^a galam@ccr.jussieu.fr

Received: 23 February 2000
Published online: 15 July 2000

Abstract

Coalition setting among a set of actors (countries, firms, individuals) is studied using concepts from the theory of spin glasses. Given the distribution of respective bilateral propensities to either cooperation or conflict, the phenomenon of local aggregation is modeled. In particular the number of coalitions is determined according to a minimum conflict principle. It is found not to be always two. Along these lines, previous studies are revisited and are found not to be consistent with their own principles. The model is then used to describe the fragmentation of former Yugoslavia. Results are compared to the actual situation.