https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2016-70464-0
Regular Article
Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules
1 Indian Institute of
Technology, 600036
Chennai,
India
2 Production & Quantitative
Methods Area, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
380015,
India
3 Economics Area, Indian Institute of
Management, Ahmedabad
380015,
India
a
e-mail: anindyac@iima.ac.in
Received:
4
August
2016
Received in final form:
20
September
2016
Published online:
7
December
2016
In this paper, we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, N agents play a coordination game repeatedly, which has exactly N pure strategy Nash equilibria, and all of the equilibria are equally preferred by the agents. The problem is to select one equilibrium out of N possible equilibria in the least number of attempts. We propose a number of heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning to solve the coordination problem. We see that the agents self-organize into clusters with varying intensities depending on the heuristic rule applied, although all clusters but one are transitory in most cases. Finally, we characterize a trade-off in terms of the time requirement to achieve a degree of stability in strategies versus the efficiency of such a solution.
Key words: Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
© EDP Sciences, Società Italiana di Fisica, Springer-Verlag, 2016