https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2016-70471-1
Regular Article
Delayed response in the Hawk Dove game
1 Department of Mathematics, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO1 2UP, UK
2 School of Physics and Astronomy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
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e-mail: james.burridge@port.ac.uk
Received: 8 August 2016
Received in final form: 18 October 2016
Published online: 18 January 2017
We consider a group of agents playing the Hawk-Dove game. These agents have a finite memory of past interactions which they use to optimize their play. By both analytical and numerical approaches, we show that an instability occurs at a critical memory length, and we provide its characterization. We show also that when the game is stable, having a long memory is beneficial but that instability, which may be produced by excessively long memory, hands the advantage to those with shorter memories.
Key words: Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
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