Regular Article

Tax evasion as a contagion game: evidences from an agent-based model

¹ Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Catania and INFN Sezione di Catania, Catania, Italy
² Department of Economics and Business, University of Catania, Catania, Italy

^a e-mail: letizia.dimauro@ct.infn.it

Received: 10 December 2018
Received in final form: 23 February 2019
Published online: 20 May 2019

Abstract

This paper presents an agent-based model of a simple economic system where the personal satisfaction gained from public services and the perceived opinion of neighbors are shown to drive the individual decision about tax compliance. Results of simulations, consistent with existing literature on the topic, suggest a peculiar approach to face the plague of tax evasion.