https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2005-00108-5
Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents
1
Laboratory of Computational Engineering, Helsinki
University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
2
Department of Theoretical Physics,
Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary
Corresponding author: a msysiaho@lce.hut.fi
Received:
5
November
2004
Published online:
16
April
2005
We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). A player interacts with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at playing a strategy which maximizes its instant pay-off, assuming that the neighboring agents retain their strategies. If a player is not content with its current strategy, it will change it to the opposite one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytical approach that these rules result in cooperation levels, which differ to large extent from those obtained using the replicator dynamics.
PACS: 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory / 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution / 89.75.Kd – Patterns
© EDP Sciences, Società Italiana di Fisica, Springer-Verlag, 2005