Eur. Phys. J. B 44, 129-135 (2005)
https://doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2005-00108-5

Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents

¹ Laboratory of Computational Engineering, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland
² Department of Theoretical Physics, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary

Corresponding author: ^a msysiaho@lce.hut.fi

Received: 5 November 2004
Published online: 16 April 2005

Abstract

We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). A player interacts with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at playing a strategy which maximizes its instant pay-off, assuming that the neighboring agents retain their strategies. If a player is not content with its current strategy, it will change it to the opposite one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytical approach that these rules result in cooperation levels, which differ to large extent from those obtained using the replicator dynamics.